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NOTES
THE MARIJUANA ON THE HIGH SEAS ACT AND
JURISDICTION OVER STATELESS VESSELS
The United States government has been conducting a campaign
against drug abuse and narcotics trafficking since 1914.1 In the
mid-1970's, 2 the federal government extended its campaign beyond
the territorial limits of the United States and began to fight its
drug war on the high seas.3 As a result, United States Coast Guard"
seizures of drug-laden vessels increased dramatically during the
1970's.5 Prosecutions actually declined, however, as drug smugglers
quickly discovered a loophole in the law.6 The loophole appeared
1. See Harrison Narcotics Act, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914) (repealed 1970).
The Harrison Act required people authorized to handle or manufacture certain drugs to
register with the Collector of Internal Revenue and to maintain records of purchases and
sales. For an historical review of federal narcotics laws, see S. LEvmE, NAncoTics "ND DRUG
ABusa §§ 4.8-4.42 (1973), and J. WissmAN, DRUG ABusz: THE LAw AND TREATmENT ALTER-
NATiVE 116-28 (1978).
2. The current campaign began on March 9, 1973 when the United States Coast Guard
seized two drug-laden vessels. H.R. RP. No. 323, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as HousE REPORT].
3. The "high seas" refers to the extraterritorial waters of all maritime nations. 21 U.S.C.
§ 955b(b) (Supp. V 1981). The territorial seas of the United States extend three miles from
the coast. See, e.g., United States v. Marno-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1379 n.8 (11th Cir.
1982), cert. denied sub noma. Pauth-Arzuza v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 748 (1983); United
States v. McRary, 665 F.2d 674, 677 n.4 (5th Cir.), cert. demed, 456 U.S. 1011 (1982). The
United States also exercises limited control over foreign vessels in the contiguous zone ex-
tending from the three-mile territorial limit to twelve miles from the coast. United States
authority in this zone is limited to the enforcement of customs, fiscal, immigration, and
sanitary regulations. See Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr.
29, 1958, art. 24, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
4. The Coast Guard is the primary maritime law enforcement agency of the United
States. The Coast Guard is responsible for enforcing all federal laws that regulate activity
on or under the high seas and other waters subject to United States jurisdiction. 14 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1976); Housn REPORT, supra note 2, at 3.
5. Coast Guard Drug Law Enforcement: Hearings on H.R. 2538 Before the Subcomm. on
Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th
Cong., 1st Ses. 63-65 (1979) (statement of Ass't U.S. Att'y Michael P Sullivan, Chef, Crim.
Div., S. Dist. Fla.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
6. House REPORT, supra note 2, at 5.
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because the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act of 19707 ("Comprehensive Act") repealed an earlier statute8
that had prohibited the use of narcotics on board United States
vessels on the high seas.' Under the Comprehensive Act, the pos-
session of narcotics on vessels outside United States territorial wa-
ters was not a crime. Thus, unless prosecutors could prove that the
crewmembers were attempting or conspiring to import illicit nar-
cotics into the United States, the prosecutions failed.10
Upon boarding drug-laden vessels, Coast Guard authorities often
found that crewmembers had destroyed any evidence that might
have supported a conspiracy prosecution, such as charts marked
with United States destinations. 1 Narcotics traffickers further ex-
ploited the Comprehensive Act loophole by successfully employing
a "mother ship" technique, anchoring large vessels loaded with
marijuana just beyond the territorial waters of the United States. 2
Under the cover of darkness, smugglers transferred the marijuana
to smaller pleasure craft capable of unloading the cargo in shallow,
isolated coves along the coastline. Although the Coast Guard seized
many mother ships, the government often could not gather suffi-
cient evidence to prove that the crewmembers had conspired to
import the drugs into the United States. 13
In 1980, Congress enacted the Marijuana on the High Seas Act' 4
7. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
8. Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, Pub. L. No. 77-165, 55 Stat. 584 (1941) (re-
pealed 1970).
9. HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4.
10. Id. at 5. For a discussion of the limited success of conspiracy prosecutions, see Note,
High Seas Narcotics Smuggling and Section 955a of Title 21: Overextension of the Protec-
tive Principle of International Jurisdiction, 50 FoRDHAm L. REv. 688, 700-12 (1982).
11. See Anderson, Jurisdiction over Stateless Vessels on the High Seas: An Appraisal
Under Domestic and International Law, 13 J. MAR L. & CoM. 323, 325 (1982).
12. See Hearings, supra note 5, at 28 (statement of Rep. Thomas Railsback). See gener-
ally Stopping "Mother Ships"-A Loophole in Drug Enforcement: Hearings on S. 3437
Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
13. See Hearings, supra note 5, at 63-65.
14. 21 U.S.C. §§ 955a-955d (Supp. V 1981). The relevant provisions of the Act are:
955a. Manufacture, distribution, or possession with intent to manufacture or
distribute controlled substances on board vessels
(a) It is unlawful for any person on board a vessel of the United States, or on
board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States on the high seas,
to knowingly or intentionally manufacture or distribute, or to possess with in-
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to remedy the Comprehensive Act's inadequate enforcement provi-
sions.- As a result, prosecutions and convictions of drug smugglers
have risen sharply.15 Section 955a(a) of the Marijuana on the High
Seas Act, however, has generated considerable controversy. Section
955a(a) prohibits any person "on board a vessel subject to the ju-
risdiction of the United States on the high seas" from possessing a
controlled substance with the intent to distribute it.16 Vessels sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the United States on the high seas specif-
tent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.
(b) It is unlawful for a citizen of the United States on board any vessel to
knowingly or intentionally manufacture or distribute, or to possess with intent
to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.
(c) It is unlawful for any person on board any vessel within the customs
waters of the United States to knowingly or intentionally manufacture or dis-
tribute, or to possess with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled
substance.
(d) It is unlawful for any person to possess, manufacture, or distribute a
controlled substance-
(1) intending that it be unlawfully imported into the United States; or
(2) knowing that it will be unlawfully imported into the United States.
(h) This section is intended to reach acts of possession, manufacture, or dis-
tribution committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
955b. Definitions
As used in sections 955a to 955d of this title-
(a) "Customs waters" means those waters as defined in section 14010) of
title 19.
(b) "High seas" means all waters beyond the territorial seas of the United
States and beyond the territorial seas of any foreign nation.
(c) "Vessel of the United States" means any vessel documented under the
laws of the United States, or numbered as provided by the Federal Boat Safety
Act of 1971, as amended.. ., or owned in whole or in part by the United
States or a citizen of the United States, or a corporation created under the
laws of the United States, or any State, Territory, District, Commonwealth, or
possession thereof, unless the vessel has been granted nationality by a foreign
nation in accordance with article 5 of the Convention on the High Seas, 1958.
(d) "Vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" includes a vessel
without nationality or a vessel assimilated to a vessel without nationality, in
accordance with paragraph (2) of article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas,
1958.
15. The Marijuana on the High Seas Act took effect on September 15, 1980. Table 1
tracks the vessel seizures, prosecutions, and convictions in the Eleventh Circuit both before
and after passage of the Act. See infra text at note 19. The Eleventh Circuit encompasses
an area that offers the most convenient geographical entry point for marijuana smugglers
whose cargo usually comes from Central and South America.
16. 21 U.S.C. § 955a(a) (Supp. V 1981).
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ically include vessels without nationality,17 which are known as
stateless vessels. Under article 6(2) of the Convention on the High
Seas, is a vessel acquires stateless status by sailing under the flags
of two different nations or by flying the flag of one nation while
claiming registry in another. 9
Table 1
1 Jan.-14 Sept. 15 Sept.-31 Dec.
1980 1980 1981
Total seizures
with persons on board (POB) 25 65 118
Seizures without POB 3 6 11
U.S. vessels seized with POB 21 58 97
Foreign vessels seized with POB 2 1 15
Stateless vessels seized with POB 2 6 6
State prosecution of case 1 5 7
Federal prosecution accepted 16 51 91
Federal cases in which at least
one defendant convicted 10 33 33*
Federal cases dismissed or all
defendants acquitted 3 3 1
Number of federal cases pending
prosecution 0 1 53
Status of federal prosecution
unknown at time of compilation 3 14 4
Individuals arrested 126 373 615
Number of defendants tried as
of January 1, 1982 51 143 162
Number of defendants convicted
at trial 23 136 139
Percent of cases in which
federal prosecution accepted 64% 78% 77%
(any prosecution) (68%) (86%) (83%)
Percent conviction of cases
going to trial in which at least
one defendant convicted 77% 92% 97%
Percent of defendants tried
who were convicted 45% 95% 86%
*6 cases resulted in partial convictions; the remainder resulted in the conviction of all
defendants.
Source: LCDR B.E. Weule, U.S. Coast Guard, Legal Advisor, Operational Law Enforcement
Division.
17. Id. § 955b(d).
18. Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, art. 6(2), 13 U.S.T.
2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered into force Sept. 30, 1962).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Dominguez, 604 F.2d 304, 308 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied
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Defendants, as well as commentators, have criticized section
955a(a) because the provision fails to require proof of an intent to
distribute a controlled substance within the United States. 20 The
critics have contended that by not requiring proof of an intent to
distribute within the United States, the United States courts' as-
sertion of subject matter jurisdiction21 over cases involving the for-
eign crewmembers of stateless vessels on the high seas is inconsis-
tent with the established jurisdictional principles of international
law.22 Courts have rejected this argument,23 however, and have
held that the statute's jurisdictional reach comports with the pro-
tective principle of international law.24 As a result, the courts have
exercised subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving foreign
nationals on stateless vessels on the high seas without requiring
proof that the defendants intended to distribute a controlled sub-
stance within the United States. 25
sub noma. Sarmiento v. United States, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied
sub nom. Pauth-Arzuza v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 748 (1983); United States v. Howard-
Arias, 679 F.2d 363 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 165 (1982); United States v. James-
Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340 (S.D. Fla. 1981), vacated as moot, 29 Cam. L. REP. (BNA)
2545 (5th Cir. July 13, 1981); United States v. Angola, 514 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Fla. 1981);
Ramirez, The New Federal Statute on High Seas Seizures-A Defense View, 56 FLA. B.J.
69 (1982); Note, supra note 10.
21. The validity of a court's in personam jurisdiction over defendants is rarely an issue.
Under the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, a court has in personam jurisdiction over a defendant even
if the defendant's presence was secured unlawfully. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119
(1975); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). But see
Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933) (in personam jurisdiction over a defendant is
invalid if a self-executing treaty imposes a territorial limitation on the jurisdiction of the
United States). In personam jurisdiction alone, however, is insufficient to determine whether
a court can subject foreign nationals to a criminal trial. Even if foreign nationals are in a
court's presence, the court must decide whether subjecting them to trial is appropriate. See
infra text accompanying note 132.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 26-58.
23. See United States v. Newball, 524 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); United States v.
James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340 (S.D. Fla. 1981), vacated as moot, 29 Cans. L. REP.
(BNA) 2545 (5th Cir. July 13, 1981).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 57-58.
25. See infra notes 67-111 and accompanying text. A recent decision has interpreted the
phrase "vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States on the high seas" to mean
that federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving foreign
crewmembers of a stateless vessel solely as a consequence of the vessel's stateless status.
United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom.
Pauth-Arzuza v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 748 (1983). See also United States v. Howard-
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This Note analyzes the intended and appropriate reach of the
Marijuana on the High Seas Act by reviewing the established juris-
dictional principles of international law and examining the Act's
legislative history. The Note concludes that, although the statute
and its legislative history are ambiguous, the statutory objective
does comport with international law. Accordingly, United States
courts properly may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over most
cases involving foreign crewmembers accused of violating the Act.
JURISDICTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The primary sources of international law are treaties and cus-
tom. 28 Treaties manifest a nation's express consent to abide by cer-
tain rules of international conduct; custom reflects the implied
consent of some nations to the conduct of others.27 Customary in-
ternational law results from a continuous process of rejection or
tacit acceptance of a government's unilateral claims of power or
authority in the world community. 28 The reciprocal patterns of as-
sertion and deference ultimately produce general principles of in-
ternational jurisdiction. 29 Any nation whose courts exert subject
matter jurisdiction over cases involving persons or property outside
the nation's territorial boundaries must base that exercise of juris-
diction on some international jurisdictional principle.
International jurisdictional principles are part of the common
law of the United States.30 Congress may override these principles
Arias, 679 F.2d 363 (4th Cir.) (alternate holding), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 165 (1982). No
recognized principle of international law supports this view of the status of stateless vessels
on the high seas.
26. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 19 (M. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955). Court deci-
sions, as well as "the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various na-
tions," are subsidiary sources of international law. Id. §§ 19a-19b.
27. Id. §§ 12, 16-19.
28. McDougal, The Hydrogen B6mb Tests and the International Law of the Sea, 49 AM.
J. INT'L L. 356, 356-57 (1955).
29. R. FALK, THE RoLE or DoMEsTIc CoURTS iN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 21-52
(1964). Falk defines jurisdiction as "the process by which the limits of legal competence are
specified, that is, how far a decision-maker may go in asserting a claim to exercise legal
control over men, things, and events." Id. at 53. See also Dickinson, Research in Interna-
tional Law-Pt. II. Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 443 (Supp.
1935).
30. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law,
and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdic-
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by statute or treaty, but congressional intent to do so must be clear
and unequivocal.3 1 The legislative history of the Marijuana on the
High Seas Act demonstrates that Congress intended that the Act
comply with international law.3 2 Thus, a federal court must look to
international jurisdictional principles to determine whether it has
subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving violations of sec-
tion 955a by foreign crewmembers of stateless vessels.
International law recognizes five general principles of subject
matter jurisdiction:33 passive personalty; nationality; territorial;
universality; and the protective principle. If these principles do not
support the court's assertion of jurisdiction, then the court should
dismiss the case.
The Passive Personalty Principle
The passive personalty principle allows a nation's courts to as-
sert jurisdiction over anyone who injures that nation's citizens.3
United States courts, however, generally have rejected this princi-
tion, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination.").
31. See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64,118 (1804) ("[A]n
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possi-
ble construction remains."); United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340 (S.D. Fla.
1981), vacated as moot, 29 CRns. L. REP. (BNA) 2545 (5th Cir. July 13, 1981); Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1178-79 (E.D. Pa. 1980); RESTATE-
MENT (SEcoND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 3(3), 145(1)
(1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
32. HouSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 11 (Congress intended that § 955a(a) apply to all acts
that the United States can prohibit under internatiofial law); see also United States v. Ma-
rino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1379-80 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Pauth-Arzuza v.
United States, 103 S. Ct. 748 (1983); United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340,
1343 (S.D. Fla. 1981), vacated as moot, 29 CRn. L. REP. (BNA) 2545 (5th Cir. July 13,
1981).
33. United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10-11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936
(1968); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Groleau
v. United States, 389 U.S. 884 (1967). See also United States v. Smith, 680 F.2d 255, 257
(1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 738 (1983); United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d
1373, 1380-82 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Pauth-Arzuza v. United States, 103 S.
Ct. 748 (1983); RESTATEmENT, supra note 31, §§ 10-36; Dickinson, supra note 29, at 445.
34. United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 & n.5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936
(1968); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 & n.9 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Groleau v. United States, 389 U.S. 884 (1967); Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545, 549 n.4
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961).
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ple as a legitimate basis for exercising jurisdiction.3 5
The Nationality Principle
A nation's courts also may assert jurisdiction on the basis of the
nationality principle, which recognizes that the courts have juris-
diction over the criminal acts of nationals committed outside the
nation's territory.38 The nationality principle, therefore, allows
United States courts to exercise jurisdiction over the prosecution
of United States citizens under section 955a(b). Section 955a(b)
prohibits United States citizens on board any vessel from possess-
ing controlled substances with the intent to distribute.37 Under the
law of the flag theory of nationality, United States courts also may
exercise subject matter jurisdiction to hear cases involving any per-
son arrested on board a United States vessel.38 United States
courts could exercise jurisdiction under the theory regardless of the
nationality of the person arrested or the location of the vessel at
35. See, e.g., United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1381 n.15 (11th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied sub noma. Pauth-Arzuza v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 748 (1983); Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1179 n.38 (E.D. Pa. 1980); see also
RESTATEMENT, supra note 31, § 30(2). But see United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212,
216 n.5 (N.D. Cal.) (alternate holding) (finding passive personalty jurisdiction over a defen-
dant accused of killing a United States congressman in Guyana), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 973
(1981).
36. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1932); United States v. Pizzarusso,
388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d
882, 885 & n.6 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Groleau v. United States, 389 U.S. 884
(1967); RESTATEMENT, supra note 31, §§ 26-29.
37. 21 U.S.C. § 955a(b) (Supp. V 1981).
38. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933);
United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1980); RESTATEMENT, supra note 31, § 28.
Under the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the law of the flag theory, a ship
is constructively a floating part of the flag state. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. at 585; United
States v. Flores, 289 U.S. at 155-56. The Supreme Court, therefore, apparently considers the
law of the flag theory to be congruent with the territorial principle. See Note, supra note 10,
at 695. For a discussion of the territorial principle, see infra text accompanying notes 40-43.
Commentators, however, have criticized this approach on the grounds that a vessel should
not be viewed as part of the territory of the flag state. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note
31, § 28 comment c; C. COLUMEos, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA §§ 303-307 (6th rev.
ed. 1967). Several courts have relied upon the law of the flag theory in asserting jurisdiction
over cases involving drug smuggling. See United States v. Julio-Diaz, 678 F.2d 1031 (11th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Liles, 670 F.2d 989, 990 n.2 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
1008 (1982); United States v. Riker, 670 F.2d 987, 988 (11th Cir. 1982).
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the time of the arrest.39
The Territorial Principle
The territorial principle of international jurisdiction bases juris-
diction on the situs of the crime.4' Under a theory of objective ter-
ritoriality, however, a nation's courts also may assert subject mat-
ter jurisdiction over illegal conduct that occurs outside the nation's
territory if the conduct creates an effect within the territory.41
United States courts have extended the objective territoriality the-
ory by asserting jurisdiction over defendants who intended to
cause an effect or consummate a conspiracy within the United
States. 2 The objective territorial principle, therefore, supports a
United States court's assertion of subject matter jurisdiction over
cases involving violations of section 955a(d), which requires proof
of a person's intent to import a controlled substance into the
United States.43
The Universality Principle
The fourth basis for subject matter jurisdiction under interna-
tional law is the universality principle. This principle allows the
court of any nation to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a
universally condemned crime if the defendant is in the nation's
custody." Most international law authorities limit jurisdiction
39. See 21 U.S.C. § 955a(a) (Supp. V 1981) (applying the law of the flag theory of juris-
diction to possession of a controlled substance with an intent to distribute).
40. United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8,10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968);
Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 & n.5 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Groleau v.
United States, 389 U.S. 884 (1967); Dickinson, supra note 29, at 480.
41. Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 620-21 (1927); Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280,
285 (1911); United States v. Smith, 680 F.2d 255, 257-58 (1st Cir. 1982); RSTATEmENT,
supra note 31, § 18.
42. See United States v. Gray, 659 F.2d 1296, 1298 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. De-
Weese, 632 F.2d 1267, 1271 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981); United States
v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124, 1129 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1980); United States
v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 138 (5th Cir. 1980).
43. See 21 U.S.C. § 955a(d) (Supp. V 1981). Congress intended that this provision reach
people aboard foreign vessels on the high seas who intend to import drugs into the United
States. HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 13.
44. United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 n.5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936
(1968); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 & n.8 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Groleau v. United States, 389 U.S. 884 (1967).
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based on universality to acts of piracy and slave trading, 5 but have
not ruled out the future application of universality to other of-
fenses as well.46 United States courts never have recognized univer-
sality as a basis for jurisdiction over drug smuggling,47 although
some commentators have maintained that courts should exercise
jurisdiction based on universality because of the international con-
demnation of drug smuggling.48
Condemnation of drug trafficking is not a recent development.
As early as 1912, several nations participated in the first interna-
tional narcotics convention.49 Numerous other conventions have
occurred since then, including the Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs.50 Signed by one hundred thirty-one nations,51 the Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs provides a comprehensive interna-
tional system of narcotics control. Because of the need to accom-
modate the participants' differing legal systems, the Convention
has no strong enforcement provisions.52 The treaty relies instead
45. RESTATEhENT, supra note 31, § 34; Dickinson, supra note 29, at 563-64. See also Con-
vention on the High Seas, supra note 18, arts. 13-19.
46. RESTATEMENT, supra note 31, § 34 reporters' note 2; Dickinson, supra note 29, at 569-
72.
47. See United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1382 n.16 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating
that the court would extend universality to drug trafficking only under congressional direc-
tion), cert. denied sub nom. Pauth-Arzuza v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 748 (1983); United
States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340, 1344 n.6 (S.D. Fla. 1981), vacated as moot, 29
CriM. L. REP. (BNA) 2545 (5th Cir. July 13, 1981).
48. Raskin, The New Federal Statute on a High Seas Seizure-A Governmental View,
56 FLA. B.J. 168 (1982); Note, "Double Jeopardy" on the High Seas: International Narcot-
ics Traffickers Beware, 10 GA. J. INT'L & CoM. L. 647, 670 (1980).
49. International Opium Convention, Jan. 23, 1912, 38 Stat. 1912, T.S. No. 612, 8
L.N.T.S. 187. For a history of international narcotics control, see Noll, International Trea-
ties and the Control of Drug Use and Abuse, 6 CoNTEmp. DRUG PROBS. 17 (1977); Waddell,
International Narcotics Control, 64 AM. J. IN'L L. 310 (1970).
50. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, T.I.A.S. No.
6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 204.
51. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 260-66 (1982).
52. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, supra note 50, arts. 35-36. See Waddell, supra
note 49, at 319. Article 108 of the current draft provision of the Third United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea contains similar provisions:
Illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances
1. All States shall co-operate in the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances by ships on the high seas contrary to inter-
national conventions.
2. Any State which has reasonable grounds for believing that a vessel flying its
flag is engaged in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances may
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on the cooperation of the member nations to enforce its provi-
sions.53 Despite the Convention's condemnation of drug trafficking,
the parties to the Convention apparently refused to apply the
universality principle. The participants failed to ratify a proposal
that would have allowed "serious offenses committed abroad either
by nationals or by foreigners [to] be prosecuted by the state in
which the offender might be found if otherwise the offender might
escape prosecution." 54
Congress similarly has refused to apply the universality principle
to drug smuggling.55 If Congress intended to rely upon the univer-
sality principle, section 955a(d), which requires proof that an indi-
vidual intended to import a controlled substance into the United
States, would have been unnecessary.5" United States courts,
therefore, cannot use the universality principle to support subject
matter jurisdiction over drug smugglers accused of violating sec-
tion 955a.
The Protective Principle
The final principle of international law is the protective princi-
ple. Under the protective principle, a nation's courts have subject
matter jurisdiction over any case involving a person whose conduct
outside the nation's territory has a potentially adverse effect upon
the nation's security or the operation of its governmental func-
request the co-operation of other States to suppress such traffic.
Informal Composit Negotiating Text/Revision 2, Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, UN Doc. A/Conf.62/WP.10/Rev. 2 (1980).
53. Noll, supra note 49, at 18.
54. Collins, Traffic in the Traffickers: Extradition and the Controlled Substances Import
and Export Act of 1970, 83 YAx L.J. 706, 725-26 (1974).
55. Congress failed to adopt an international scheme recommended by the State Depart-
ment to combat drug trafficking. One congressman, however, observed that "[a]bsent an
elevation of international drug trafficking to the status of jus gentium through revisions to
the Convention on the High Seas ...incorporating the Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs, .. .. [the State Department's] approach appears to have the greatest potential for
success... " HousE. REPORT, supra note 2, at 8 (remarks of Rep. John Murphy). Jus gen-
tium describes any law that all nations observe, such as the universally observed prohibition
against piracy. See BLAcK's LAW DicTIoNARY 772 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
56. See 21 U.S.C. § 955a(d) (Supp. V 1981). Of course, the objective territorial principle
supports jurisdiction over conduct on the high seas that causes an effect within the United
States. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
1983] 323
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:313
tions 7 The protective principle, unlike the objective territorial
principle, does not require proof that the defendant caused, or in-
tended to cause, an effect within the United States.58
Few United States courts have exercised subject matter jurisdic-
tion on the basis of the protective principle. Cases in which the
courts relied on the protective principle typically involved the for-
gery of government documents in foreign countries or attempts to
obtain illegal entry into the United States.5 9 Except for these few
cases, courts generally have relied on the territorial principle to
support the exercise of jurisdiction. 0
Several cases decided before the enactment of section 955a, how-
ever, suggested that the protective principle did apply to cases
arising from narcotics trafficking on the high seas. l In United
States v. Egan,6 2 for example, the defendants had committed nu-
merous violations of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act of 1970,6a including a conspiracy to import mari-
57. United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10-11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936
(1968); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 & n.7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub noma.
Groleau v. United States, 389 U.S. 884 (1967); United States v. Newball, 524 F. Supp. 715,
720 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); RESTATEMENT, supra note 31, § 33 comment c. The Restatement addi-
tionally requires the conduct to be "generally recognized as a crime under the law of states
that have reasonably developed legal systems." Id. § 33(1). The Single Convention on Nar-
cotic Drugs, supra note 50, provides sufficient evidence that narcotics trafficking is a gener-
ally recognized crime.
58. United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10-11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936
(1968); RESTATEmENT, supra note 31, § 33 comment c. See also United States v. Marino-
Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1381 & n.14 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Pauth-Arzuza v.
United States, 103 S. Ct. 748 (1983); United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340,
1344 (S.D. Fla. 1981), vacated as moot, 29 CPmM L. REP. (BNA) 2545 (5th Cir. July 13, 1981).
59. See, e.g., United States v. Khalje, 658 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1981) (false statements on a
United States visa application); United States v. Birch, 470 F.2d 808 (4th Cir. 1972) (forged
military papers to gain illegal entry into the United States), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931
(1973); United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.) (false statements on a United States
visa application), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968); Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545
(9th Cir.) (attempt to enter the United States illegally), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961).
60. See RESrATEmENT, supra note 31, § 33 reporters' note.
61. See United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1258 n.6 (5th Cir. 1978) (dictum); United
States v. Newball, 524 F. Supp. 715, 720 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (alternate holding); United States
v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252, 1257-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (alternate holding); United States v.
Keller, 451 F. Supp. 631, 635 (D.P.R. 1978) (alternate holding), affd sub nom. United States
v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836 (1st Cir. 1980) (applying territorial principle).
62. 501 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
63. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
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juana and possession of marijuana with an intent to distribute."
Finding that "[t]he unlawful importation of drugs bypasses the
federal customs laws, and thus directly challenges a governmental
function, 65 the court claimed jurisdiction under both the objective
territorial principle and the protective principle. 66
THE PROTECTIVE PRINCIPLE AND SECTION 955a(a)
United States v. Angola6 7 was the first case involving foreign
drug smugglers in which a United States court asserted subject
matter jurisdiction solely on the basis of the protective principle.
In Angola, the Coast Guard arrested foreign nationals aboard a
stateless vessel just west of the Bahamian island of San Salvador. 8
The government indicted the defendants under section 955a(a) for
possession of a controlled substance with an intent to distribute
while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States.69 The defendants moved to dismiss the action for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that no international legal
principle enabled United States courts to hear a case that had no
established connection to the United States.70 In denying the mo-
tion, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida upheld its exercise of jurisdiction under the protective
principle: "This vessel, full of marijuana, represented a real, not an
imaginary, potential for harm to the effective administration of the
United States' customs and narcotics laws."'
In Angola, the court found that the stateless vessel's eventual
destination was irrelevant because the vessel acted as a mother
64. 501 F. Supp. at 1258.
65. Id. (citing United States v. Keller, 451 F. Supp. 631, 635 (D.P.R. 1978)). The district
court in Keller exercised jurisdiction based upon the protective principle because the defen-
dants had conspired to import marijuana into the United States. 451 F. Supp. at 635. On
appeal, however, the First Circuit affirmed the convictions on the basis of the territorial
principle. United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 840 (1st Cir. 1980). See Note, Drug Smug-
gling and the Protective Principle: A Journey Into Uncharted Waters, 39 LA. L. REv. 1189
(1979).
66. 501 F. Supp. at 1257.
67. 514 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
68. Id. at 936.
69. The vessel was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States because of its stateless
status. See 21 U.S.C. § 955b(d) (Supp. V 1981).
70. 514 F. Supp. at 934.
71. Id. at 936.
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ship, whose cargo would flow eventually into the United States.72
The Coast Guard had seized the vessel near a frequently used
stopping point for marijuana-laden vessels whose cargo was en-
route to the United States. The vessel's location on the marijuana
trade route was critical. The court implied that if "a stateless ves-
sel was stopped half way around the world in the Gulf of Siam,"
the protective principle would not have provided the court with
subject matter jurisdiction.78
The outcome in Angola was precisely the result that Congress
intended by enacting section 955a(a). Under previous statutes,
United States district attorneys often declined to prosecute mother
ship crewmembers because of a lack of evidence that the crews in-
tended to import the drugs into the United States.7 4 Congress care-
fully drafted section 955a(a) so as not to require any proof that
crewmen aboard stateless vessels intended to distribute controlled
substances within the United States.7 5 To obtain a conviction
under section 955a(a), the prosecutor needs to establish only that
the foreign crewmembers aboard a stateless vessel possessed a con-
trolled substance with an intent to distribute.78 The presence of a
large quantity of marijuana aboard the mother ship is sufficient to
establish an intent to distribute.
The legislative history of section 955a also reveals a congres-
sional recognition of the protective principle as a basis for extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction over people committing offenses that may harm
the vital interests of the United States.78 Congress realized that it
72. Id. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
73. 514 F. Supp. at 936.
74. See Hearings, supra note 5, at 64.
75. See HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 10.
76. The court should not hear the case, however, unless the prosecutor has established a
jurisdictional basis sufficient to satisfy one of the jurisdictional principles of international
law. See supra notes 26-58 and accompanying text. The need to establish a jurisdictional
basis under the protective principle, for example, presents additional problems of pleading
and proof beyond the minimal evidence necessary to convict a foreign crewmember under
the statutory language of § 955a(a). See infra notes 85-99 and accompanying text.
77. House REPORT, supra note 2, at 10. See also United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282,
1293 (9th Cir. 1980) ("[P]ersonal consumption of 17,000 pounds of anything, much less ma-
rijuana, is a staggering proposition sufficient to compel disbelief, leaving commercial distri-
bution as the only realistic goal of the enterprise."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981).
78. HousE RFORT, supra note 2, at 7-8 (citing Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187
(1804), the seminal decision enunciating the protective principle).
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had "to act now in our national interest to halt the tide of illegal
drugs inundating our shores. '17 The court in Angola demonstrated
sensitivity to these congressional concerns.8 0
Narcotics trafficking on the high seas undermines vital United
States interests in a variety of ways. For example, drug trafficking
circumvents federal customs laws, fuels drug-related violence in
American cities, and adversely affects the economy, particularly in
those areas where indigent addicts must steal to support their hab-
its."' Moreover, a steady stream of untaxed dollars flows from the
United States to drug-producing countries in Central and South
America. Finally, drug smuggling is partially responsible for the in-
flux of illegal aliens from the West Indies and Central America. s2
Illicit narcotics trafficking, therefore, directly threatens the public
health and safety as much, if not more, than the forgery of visa
applications or perjury before an American consular officer abroad.
By enacting section 955a(a), Congress empowered the federal
courts to decide cases arising from marijuana smuggling on the
high seas under the protective principle. Prior congressional pref-
erence for the territorial principle of international jurisdiction is
irrelevant. As the United States District Court for the Southern
District of California noted in United States v. Rodriguez,3 previ-
ous narrow use of the protective principle does not restrict its fu-
ture applicability. The court in Rodriguez reasoned:
79. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.
80. The court adopted the holding of an unreported decision, United States v. Pauth-
Arzuza, No. 80-577-Cr-CA (S.D. Fla. 1980), in which Chief Judge Atkins stated:
Jurisdiction is supported by the protective principle .... Unlike the objec-
tive theory, the protective principle supports assertion of extra-territorial juris-
diction without a showing of actual effect on the nation. It is enough to show
that the activity which the nation seeks to regulate has a potentially adverse
effect on the nation. Congress reasonably has concluded the growing drug
problem presents such a potentially adverse effect on the nation. To protect
the nation's borders from the importation of illegal narcotics, it is necessary to
attempt regulation of vessels on the high seas notwithstanding the absence of
any objective proof of an intent to import into the United States.
514 F. Supp. at 935.
81. See Raskin, supra note 48, at 170.
82. HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 4.
83. 182 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Cal. 1960). Based upon the protective principle, the court in
Rodriguez asserted jurisdiction over aliens who used false statements to procure documents
necessary for admission into the United States. See id.
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From the body of international law, the Congress may pick and
choose whatever recognized principle of international jurisdic-
tion is necessary to accomplish -the purpose sought by the legis-
lation. The mere fact that, in the past, Congress may not have
seen fit to embody in legislation the full scope of its authorized
powers is not a basis for now finding that those powers are
lacking."
Critics of the application of the protective principle to high seas
narcotics smuggling point to the decision in United States v.
James-Robinson85 to support their arguments.8" Although the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ordered the
district court to dismiss James-Robinson as moot,87 thus negating
the precedential value of the district court's earlier decision, prose-
cutors should consider the practical implications of the district
court's concerns. In James-Robinson, the Coast Guard stopped a
stateless vessel on the high seas more than 400 miles from the con-
tinental United States and arrested the Colombian crewmembers
for possession of marijuana with an intent to distribute.88 From the
first sighting of the vessel until its seizure, the vessel was heading
towards the Bahamas.8 9 The government argued that proof of the
crewmembers' intent to distribute the seized marijuana within the
United States was not necessary to establish the court's jurisdic-
tion because of the applicability of the protective principle.90
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida concluded, however, that it lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion because the government had failed to allege "that the defen-
dants caused, or intended to cause, some kind of effect in or to the
84. Id. at 491. See also Note, supra note 65, at 1191-92.
85. 515 F. Supp. 1340 (S.D. Fla. 1981), vacated as moot, 29 CRiM. L. REP. (BNA) 2545
(5th Cir. July 13, 1981).
86. See Ramirez, supra note 20, at 71; Note, supra note 10, at 717-19.
87. Following the district court's decision, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
returned the crewmembers to their native Colombia. Over defense objections, the Fifth Cir-
cuit granted the government's motion to vacate the district court's judgment, and remanded
with instructions to dismiss the indictment as moot. United States v. James-Robinson, 29
CanM. L. REP. (BNA) 2545 (5th Cir. July 13, 1981).
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United States.""1 The court did not require, as some commentators
have proposed, that an indictment under section 955a(a) contain
an allegation of intent to distribute marijuana within the United
States.92 Whether section 955a(a) implicitly requires proof of in-
tent to distribute controlled substances within the United States
was "a question for another day, and for another indictment: one
which charges some intent to affect the United States in some
fashion."' 3
The district court in James-Robinson tested the sufficiency of
the indictment solely on the basis of the protective principle of
jurisdiction.94 After extensively reviewing the relevant case law, the
court found that the invocation of the protective principle required
a showing of a specific demonstrable effect on the national security
or governmental functions of the United States.95 As the court
noted, "[n]ever in a published opinion of an American court has a
potential generalized effect, which might or might not also be an
effect on the United States, been found sufficient to invoke the
protective principle."9 6 The court further explained the procedural
deficiency of the indictment in an important footnote:
This Court agrees that unlawful drugs have created major
problems in the United States, with a consequent effect on na-
tional security being a possible result. But that is not alleged
and the government says it will not prove that here. The fatal
problem with this indictment is that it does not allege any spe-
cific effect to this country.Y
The prosecution failed to establish that the vessel in James-
91. Id. An effect "to the United States" suggests a potential threat to its security or gov-
ernmental functions. Under the protective principle, such a threat would provide United
States courts with jurisdiction over cases involving the foreign crews of stateless vessels. See
supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
92. See Note, supra note 10, at 717-18; Case Comment,-The Enforceability of the Mari-
juana on the High Seas Act: United States v. James-Robinson et al, 13 LAw. OF THE AM.
581, 583-84 (1981).
93. 515 F. Supp. at 1347.
94. Id. at 1344.
95. Id. at 1345.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1345 n.7. The court, therefore, suggested that the protective principle would
have applied if the indictment had been sufficient. See supra note 91 and accompanying
text.
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Robinson was a mother ship, or that the defendants intended to
distribute the cargo. The stipulated facts contained no information
about the vessel's size or the quantity of marijuana found on
board. The government also failed to inform the court that the
Coast Guard first sighted the vessel in a location where mother
ships frequently transferred their cargo to smaller vessels. The
prosecution apparently did not attempt to prove that the vessel
changed its heading after learning that the Coast Guard was in the
area. The few facts alleged simply did not convince the court that
the vessel threatened the national security or governmental func-
tions of the United States. 98
The decision in James-Robinson should alert prosecutors that
courts may require specific allegations in the indictment that a
stateless vessel carrying marijuana on the high seas is a mother
ship, whose presence represents a threat to the national security of
the United States sufficient to invoke the protective principle. As
the Coast Guard seizes mother ships farther from United States
territorial waters, the burden of persuading a court that the vessels
threaten national security or governmental functions probably in-
creases. Although Congress enacted section 955a(a) specifically to
allow courts to exercise jurisdiction over foreign crewmembers
aboard stateless mother ships,99 nothing suggests that Congress an-
ticipated Coast Guard seizures of stateless vessels carrying mari-
juana half way around the world.
Recent cases reveal greater judicial recognition of the mother
ship problem and the objectives of section 955a(a). In United
States v. Newball,100 the Coast Guard boarded a fishing boat ap-
proximately sixty miles south of Nantucket and discovered numer-
ous bales of marijuana.10 1 After the vessel's master produced docu-
mentation purporting to show Honduran registry, the boarding
party withdrew to secure permission from the Honduran govern-
ment to seize the vessel.10 2 The Coast Guard trailed the vessel
98. 515 F. Supp. at 1346. The district court in James-Robinson refused to find that "a
stateless ship carrying marijuana on the high seas 400 miles from the United States by defi-
nition represents a threat to our national security or to our government's functions." Id.
99. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
100. 524 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
101. Id. at 717.
102. Id. at 717-18. The Coast Guard also attempted to verify the vessel's identity. Id.
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while awaiting a response, and alertly intervened when the foreign
crewmembers attempted to set the vessel on fire and escape in a
small launch.103
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York exercised jurisdiction on the basis of both the law of the flag
principle and the protective principle.' ° After commenting upon
the notoriety of mother ship operations, the court found that the
vessel's location when stopped, and the nearly twelve tons of mari-
juana aboard, "made it at least likely that the marijuana ...
would enter the country."10 5 The court maintained that whether
the crewmembers actually knew that the marijuana would enter
the United States was irrelevant to the court's ability to hear the
case.
108
In United States v. Howard-Arias,10 7 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit viewed the legislative intent of sec-
tion 955a(a) as a congressional mandate to prosecute foreign
crewmembers aboard stateless mother ships. In Howard-Arias, the
Coast Guard sought to rescue a disabled ship sixty miles off the
Virginia coast. An officer boarded the wreckage and discovered 240
bales of marijuana, which the Coast Guard salvaged before the ves-
sel sank.108 A crewmember appealed his conviction under section
955a(a) on the theory that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to try a case involving a foreign citizen aboard a state-
less vessel on the high seas without proof of an intent to distribute
the marijuana within the United States.109
The court's extensive review of the statute's legislative history
revealed congressional sensitivity to international jurisdictional
principles, as well as grave congressional concern about the in-
103. Id. at 718.
104. Id. at 720. The court found that the vessel was documented under United States
laws and that a United States citizen owned the vessel. Id. at 719-20. See supra note 38 and
accompanying text.
105. 524 F. Supp. at 720.
106. Id.
107. 679 F.2d 363 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 165 (1982).
10S. Id. at 365.
109. Id. at 369. The court dismissed the appellant's challenges to certain evidentiary rul-
ings and sentencing procedures, as well as his contention that his convictions under both 21
U.S.C. § 955a(a) and 21 U.S.C. § 955a(d) violated the double jeopardy clause of the fifth
amendment. 679 F.2d at 365.
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creased incidence of drug smuggling.1 1 The court pointed to the
express congressional intent to assert protective jurisdiction over
stateless mother ships: "Congress explicitly recognized its right to
protect vital aspects of American life, and clearly sought to assert
extraterritorial jurisdiction over stateless vessels engaged primarily
in 'mother ship' smuggling activities involving controlled sub-
stances destined almost exclusively for the United States."'111
Every court confronted with a similar challenge to its jurisdic-
tion has recognized, implicitly or explicitly, that the protective
principle is a proper basis for subject matter jurisdiction over cases
involving drug smuggling operations. Section 955a(a) has aided im-
mensely the prosecution of foreign crewmembers aboard stateless
mother ships on the high seas. The protective principle of jurisdic-
tion is limited, however. A court might decline subject matter ju-
risdiction over cases involving foreign crewmembers, therefore, if
the prosecution is unable to prove that the seized vessel was in-
-deed a mother ship whose presence outside United States territo-
rial waters threatened the national security or public welfare of the
United States.
THE STATUS OF STATELESS VESSELS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Commentators agree that stateless vessel status is undesirable in
the scheme of international maritime law.11 2 The registration of
ships is essential to the maintenance of order on the high seas."1 3
As a result, a stateless vessel "enjoys no protection whatever, for
the freedom of navigation on the open sea is freedom for such ves-
sels only as sail under the flag of a State."114 Stateless status de-
prives a vessel of important privileges, such as the right to enter
and leave territorial waters and ports.?1 5
One legal scholar has asserted that a nation's power over a state-
110. 679 F.2d at 369, 371.
111. Id. at 371 (footnote omitted).
112. See, e.g., M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PULIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 1084-85
(1962); H. MEYERS, THE NATIONALITY OF SHIPS 317-18 (1967); I L. OPPENHEIM, supra note
26, § 261; R. RIENow, THE TEST OF THE NATIONALITY OF A MERCHANT VESSEL 14-15 (1937).
113. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, § 260; 9 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw 21 (1968).
114. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, § 261.
115. H. MEYERS, supra note 112, at 323; R. REwNOW, supra note 112, at 14.
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less vessel is determined by whether the nation has established a
relationship with the vessel similar to the "genuine link" that ex-
ists between a nation and a ship that legitimately flies the nation's
flag.116 A nation that intends to assume exclusive rights over a ship
must exercise sufficient authority to discharge its duties in relation
to other nations. 117 Article Five of the Convention on the High
Seas incorporates this concept by requiring a nation to "effectively
exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical
and social matters over ships flying its flag."11 8
Any nation may treat a stateless vessel as a vessel registered in
that nation, but only if the ship meets the registration require-
ments of the nation; the nation also must maintain a genuine link
through registration and discharge of its duties to protect and su-
pervise the ship. 19 A nation that is unwilling or unable to register
a vessel cannot exercise exclusive jurisdiction over that vessel
within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention on the High
Seas. 20 If a genuine link does not exist between some nation and
the vessel, the stateless vessel is subject to the general concurrent
jurisdiction of all nations; any nation may remove the vessel from
the high seas.12 1 A nation's authority to seize a stateless vessel,
however, does not mean that it's courts automatically should hear
cases involving the vessel's foreign crewmembers. Stateless vessel
status is not illegal, 22 and no court should try a case involving the
crewmembers of a stateless vessel unless the crewmembers violate
one of the nation's laws and the nation is able to invoke a recog-
116. H. MEYERS, supra note 112, at 243-49, 318. The assertion is derived from the judg-
ment of the International Court of Justice in Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guat.), 1955
I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Apr. 6). In Nottebohm, the Court resolved a conflict over a person's
nationality in favor of the nation with which the person had established a genuine link.
117. H. MsYERS, supra note 112, at 242.
118. See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 18, art. 5.
119. H. MEYERs, supra note 112, at 242, 318.
120. H. MEYERS, supra note 112, at 318. See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 18,
art. 6 ("Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and ... shall be subject to its
exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas."). The meaning of "exclusive jurisdiction" in the
context of vessel nationality is unclear. See H. MEYERS, supra note 112, at 34. Meyers dis-
cusses the history of the Convention on the High Seas and concludes that "exclusive juris-
diction" should be interpreted broadly to denote exclusive authority or sovereignty. See id.
at 33-40.
121. H. MEYERs, supra note 112, at 318, 321.
122. See id. at 318.
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nized principle of international law.123
By enacting the Marijuana on the High Seas Act, Congress did
not enable the Coast Guard to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
all stateless vessels carrying controlled substances on the high seas.
Section 955b(c) defines "vessel of the United States" to mean "any
vessel documented under the laws of the United States, . . . or
owned in whole or in part by the United States or a citizen of the
United States, or a corporation created under the laws of the
United States. ' 124 An American-owned stateless vessel is a vessel
of the United States, but a foreign-owned stateless vessel is not. If
all foreign-owned stateless vessels were vessels of the United
States, then United States courts could exercise subject matter ju-
risdiction over cases involving the foreign crewmembers on those
vessels under the law of the flag jurisdictional theory.125 Congress
could have provided that all stateless vessels on the high seas car-
rying controlled substances automatically qualify as United States
vessels, but such a provision would have no basis in international
law. Courts, therefore, should not ascribe such an interpretation to
section 955b(c).
Courts must be careful to distinguish between the Coast Guard's
authority to board and search vessels 26 and the court's jurisdiction
to decide cases involving the foreign crewmembers aboard those
vessels. The court in United States v. James-Robinson127 noted
the difference: "While 'any nation may extend its authority over a
stateless ship,' . . . the issue before the Court is not of such an in
rem nature. Rather, the issue is whether the U.S. may extend its
authority over the foreign citizen crewmembers of such a stateless
ship."'1 28
Congress may enact laws that apply to stateless vessels,12 9 but
federal courts must determine under international law whether
they have subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving the for-
123. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
124. 21 U.S.C. § 955b(c) (Supp. V 1981).
125. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
126. See 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1976).
127. 515 F. Supp. 1340 (S.D. Fla. 1981), vacated as moot, 29 CRiM. L. REP. (BNA) 2545
(5th Cir. July 13, 1981).
128. 515 F. Supp. at 1343 n.5 (citation omitted).
129. H. MEYsRs, supra note 112, at 318-19.
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eign crewmen. Courts consistently have upheld the Coast Guard's
authority to board and search a ship believed to be stateless to
elicit information about the vessel's identity and registration. 130
The international legal doctrine of "right of approach" 131 supports
the Coast Guard's authority in such situations. The Coast Guard's
authority over stateless vessels, however, is limited to searches,
seizures, and arrests of crewmembers suspected of violating United
States laws. Custody of the crewmembers provides a court with in
personam jurisdiction, but the court must refer to international
law to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction to hear
the case.32
THE STATUS OF STATELESS VESSELS AND United States v. Marino-
Garcia
The elimination of mother ship operations is a commendable
goal, but courts have become overzealous in asserting jurisdiction
over cases involving foreign crewmembers aboard stateless mother
ships. This judicial overzealousness has led at least one court to
misinterpret both customary international law and the language of
section 955a(a).
In United States v. Marino-Garcia,13 3 the Coast Guard boarded
a stateless vessel sixty-five miles off the west coast of Cuba and 300
miles from Florida.1 3 4 Upon discovering approximately 57,000
pounds of marijuana, the Coast Guard seized the vessel and ar-
rested the foreign crewmen.1 35 A federal grand jury indicted the
crewmen under section 955a for conspiracy to possess marijuana
and possession of marijuana with an intent to distribute. 136 The
defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
130. See, e.g., United States v. Rubies, 612 F.2d 397, 402-03 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 940 (1980); United States v. Dominguez, 604 F.2d 304, 308-09 (4th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980); United States v. Cortes, 588 F.2d 106, 108-10 (5th Cir. 1979).
131. See, e.g., The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 47-49 (1826); United States v.
Cortes, 588 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1979); C. COLUMBOS, supra note 38, §§ 334-336; H. MsY-
ERs, supra note 112, at 82 n.1; 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, §§ 266-270.
132. See infra text accompanying notes 150-51.
133. 679 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Pauth-Arzuza v. United States,
103 S. Ct. 748 (1983).
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because no causal nexus existed between the stateless vessel and
any potential effect within the United States.37 In an unreported
decision, the district court denied the motion, finding that it had
subject matter jurisdiction under the protective principle.138
On appeal, 139 the United States Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit affirmed the convictions, but found that consideration
of the protective principle was unnecessary because "U]urisdiction
exists solely as a consequence of the vessel's status as stateless".140
The appellate court, therefore, concluded that proof of a nexus be-
tween the stateless vessel and the United States was
unnecessary.14 1
The Eleventh Circuit's holding in Marino-Garcia represents a
departure from previous judicial interpretations of the status of
stateless vessels. No principle of international law allows a court to
assert subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving foreign
crewmembers of stateless vessels without basing that jurisdiction
upon one of the accepted international principles of extraterritorial
jurisdiction.14 2 Moreover, congressional intent to abide by interna-
tional law pervades the legislative history of section 955a.143 The
137. The defendants apparently relied upon the reasoning in United States v. James-
Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340 (S.D. Fla. 1981), vacated as moot, 29 CriaM. L. REP. (BNA)
2545 (5th Cir. July 13, 1981). See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
138. 679 F.2d at 1378 & n.4. Although no direct evidence indicated that the defendants
intended to distribute the drugs within the United States, the protective principle does not
require such a specific intent. A general intent to distribute is sufficient. See supra text
accompanying notes 75-77. For a general discussion of the protective principle as applied to
drug smuggling, see supra text accompanying notes 67-111.
139. The defendants challenged the district court's jurisdiction, the admissibility of the
marijuana into evidence, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the constitutionality of § 955a.
679 F.2d at 1379, 1383, 1384, 1386.
The Eleventh Circuit also heard the government's appeal in a companion case with virtu-
ally identical facts, United States v. Cassalins-Guzman. See id. at 1373. Claiming that it
lacked jurisdiction to decide the case, the district court in Cassalins-Guzman dismissed an
indictment charging the foreign crewmen of a stateless vessel with violations of § 955a. The
district court maintained that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because the govern-
ment's allegations failed to establish the requisite nexus between the vessel and the United
States. 679 F.2d at 1378-79. On appeal, however, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and re-
manded Cassalins-Guzman to the district court with orders to reinstate the indictments.
679 F.2d at 1387.
140. 679 F.2d at 1383.
141. Id. at 1379, 1383.
142. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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Eleventh Circuit in Marino-Garcia, therefore, misinterpreted the
status of stateless vessels and misunderstood the consequences of a
vessel being "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States"
under section 955a(a).1 "
Vessels Subject to the Jurisdiction of the United States
Congress explicitly intended to prohibit any person aboard a
vessel on the high seas subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States from possessing controlled substances with an intent to dis-
tribute.145 Section 955b(d) defines "vessel subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States" to include a vessel without national-
ity.148 This definition suggests that foreign crewmembers aboard
stateless vessels automatically may be subject to federal jurisdic-
tion. In United States v. Marino-Garcia, the court construed sec-
tion 955b(d) literally and held that "the statute does not require
that there be a nexus between stateless vessels and the United
States but instead extends this country's jurisdiction to all such
vessels. 14 7 As a result, the court concluded that it had jurisdiction
over the stateless vessel's foreign crewmembers as well.
The legislative history of the statute, however, does not support
this interpretation. Throughout the subcommittee hearings, wit-
nesses indicated that they understood the term "vessel subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States" to mean vessels that the
Coast Guard could board and search lawfully under the authority
of 14 U.S.C. § 89(a).1 48 At least one witness realized that the defi-
nition invited misinterpretation: "I believe the definition confuses
jurisdiction over crimes that are cognizable in a Federal court with
jurisdiction of the Coast Guard to perform searches and seizures
on the high seas. '149
The Coast Guard's limited authority to board stateless vessels
on the high seas does not confer subject matter jurisdiction over
144. See 21 U.S.C. § 955a(a) (Supp. V 1981).
145. HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 12.
146. 21 U.S.C. § 955b(d) (Supp. V 1981).
147. 679 F.2d at 1379.
148. See Hearings, supra note 5, at 48, 51, 54-55.
149. Id. at 66 (statement of Ass't U.S. Att'y Michael P. Sullivan, Chief, Crim. Div., S.
Dist. Fla.).
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cases involving the vessel's foreign crewmembers1 50 because a ves-
sel's stateless status does not affect the nationality of the individu-
als on board.15 1 In United States v. Marino-Garcia, the Eleventh
Circuit incorrectly assumed that stateless status "makes the vessel
subject to action by all nations proscribing certain activities aboard
stateless vessels and subjects those persons aboard to prosecution
for violating the proscriptions. '1 52 The court thus maintained that
stateless status obviated the need to establish a nexus between the
activity aboard the stateless vessel and the country asserting juris-
diction over the foreign crewmembers. 55 The court, however, con-
spicuously failed to cite any international legal principle to support
this proposition. In fact, none exists.
Adoption of the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in Marino-Garcia
could lead to absurd results. If the crewmembers of a stateless ves-
sel on the high seas carrying marijuana are subject per se to the
jurisdiction of the United States as a result of the Marijuana on
the High Seas Act, then the crewmembers would be subject to the
jurisdiction of any nation that enacted a similar statute. Further-
more, a nation might enact a statute prohibiting an activity that
international law generally or specifically protects. For example,
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as adopted by the
United Nations, recognizes every person's right "to seek, receive
and impart information and ideas through any media and regard-
less of frontiers."' Nevertheless, a foreign nation might prohibit
the exchange of information. The territorial and protective princi-
ples could provide a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over cases
involving foreign nationals who violate the statute while aboard
stateless vessels on the high seas.155 The nation would be required
to show, however, that the free flow of information had an adverse
effect within the nation. Applying the Eleventh Circuit's rationale,
the nation's courts conceivably could assert jurisdiction over such
150. United States v. James-Robinson, 515 F. Supp. 1340, 1343 n.5 (S.D. Fla. 1981), va-
cated as moot, 29 CaM. L. Ru. (BNA) 2545 (5th Cir. July 13, 1981); United States v. Egan,
501 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
151. H. MEyRs, supra note 112, at 309.
152. 679 F.2d at 1383.
153. Id.
154. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 19 (1948).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43 & 57-58.
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cases in the absence of any adverse effect; the vessel's stateless sta-
tus would be sufficient to support jurisdiction. Absent a require-
ment that the nation's assertion of jurisdiction over cases involving
the foreign crewmembers be based on a recognized international
jurisdictional principle, therefore, the right to exchange informa-
tion would be impaired.
Finally, the per se approach of the court in Marino-Garcia ex-
tends the subject matter jurisdiction of United States courts to in-
stances of drug smuggling throughout the world. The court in
United States v. Angola correctly indicated that the protective
principle would not support such an extension of subject matter
jurisdiction. 156 Nor does the legislative history of the Marijuana on
the High Seas Act offer a basis for world-wide federal jurisdiction
over the crewmembers of stateless vessels carrying controlled sub-
stances on the high seas.
Stateless status deprives vessels of important privileges and pro-
tections.157 Crewmembers, however, do not expose themselves to
universal jurisdiction simply because they choose to sail on state-
less vessels. Any nation wishing to assert jurisdiction over cases in-
volving the crewmembers of stateless vessels on the high seas must
apply one of the customary jurisdictional principles of interna-
tional law 58 to determine whether the court properly can hear the
case. The per se approach is not a customary international jurisdic-
tional principle. The Eleventh Circuit in Marino-Garcia, therefore,
should have adopted the district court's finding that subject mat-
ter jurisdiction existed under the protective principle. By asserting
jurisdiction solely on the basis of the vessel's stateless status, the
Eleventh Circuit disregarded the congressional intent that jurisdic-
tion over section 955a violations should not exceed the permissible
limits of international law.159
CONCLUSION
Since the passage of the Marijuana on the High Seas Act, prose-
cutions and convictions of drug smugglers have increased dramati-
156. See supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 114-15.
158. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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cally. Although this Note has focused primarily on the subject
matter jurisdiction of United States courts over cases involving
foreign crewmembers aboard stateless vessels, the Act also imposes
criminal liability on drug smugglers aboard vessels registered in
the United States and foreign countries.160 The Act's most signifi-
cant accomplishment has been the elimination of the requirement
that prosecutors prove conspiracy to import controlled sub-
stances.' 6 ' Coast Guard officials now may attack mother ship drug
operations vigorously and know that their efforts will not be in
vain.
United States courts, however, should not regard the interna-
tional legal implications of the Marijuana on the High Seas Act
lightly. Congress was sensitive to international jurisdictional re-
quirements when it drafted the Act. In the interest of international
judicial comity, United States courts should observe customary in-
ternational jurisdictional requirements. Otherwise, foreign tribu-
nals might retaliate against United States citizens.
With these considerations in mind, federal courts can exercise
jurisdiction over cases involving foreign crewmembers aboard
stateless vessels on the basis of the protective principle and remain
within the bounds of international law. Interpreting the Marijuana
on the High Seas Act to support jurisdiction over foreign
crewmembers solely on the basis of a vessel's stateless status ig-
nores established principles of international law. With the unstable
international legal order, United States courts cannot ignore the
possibility that serious repercussions may result from unprincipled
assertions of jurisdiction.
JOSEPH R. BRENDEL
160. See supra note 14. Section 955a(a) imposes criminal liability on any person aboard a
United States vessel on the high seas who possesses a controlled substance with the intent
to distribute. Section 955a(d) applies to foreign vessels because it prohibits any person from
possessing or distributing a controlled substance intending that it be unlawfully imported
into the United States. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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